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In this article we attempt to replicate the hypothesis tested by Rummel and others 
that external and internal conflict are unrelated. We do this using data for l 2S nations 
for the years 1966-J 967. As did Rummel, wc use exploratory factor analysis and rcgression 
analysis; in addition, we also employ confirmatory factor analysis. Results from confirma-
tory factor analysis contradict Rummel and reveal moderately strong correlations be-
twcen internal and external conflict factors. Regression anal~is and partial correlations, 
however, show that zero-order cross-country corrclations bctwcen internal and extemal 
conflict are reduccd to insignificance whcn a control variable, population siz.e, is intro-
duced in the analysis. 
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(n the analysis of the relationship between internal and external 
conflict, comparative politics and international politics intersect. If 
nations differ with respect to their levels of instability and the amount of 
internal conflict they experience, then these variations might explain 
varying national involvement in external conflict. Following Bodin, 
Waltz (1959: 81) argues that "the best way of preserving a state and 
guaranteeing against sedition and civil war is to keep the subjects 
in amity with one another and, to this end, to find an enemy against 
whom they can make a common cause." Rosecrance ( 1963: 304) argues 
similarly: "There tends to be a correlation between international insta-
bility and the domestic security of elites." Thus with increasing domestic 
conflict and growing instability one would expect the corresponding 
nations' ruling elites to engage in external conflict in order to divert thc 
populace from domestic problems in the attempt to stabilize their 
leadership. The dependence of external conflict behavior on domestic 
conflict or instability becomes obvious in the form of hazardous 
foreign policy behavior. In the literature, the externalization hypothesis 
captures this theoretical perspective. From this it has been deduced that 
indicators of internal and external conflict should correlate with one 
another. lf, in fact, we find such correlations, the hypothesis is corrobo-
rated. but certainly not proven. The hypothesis will only have success-
fully withstood one attempt at falsification (Popper, 1969). 
There may be other reasons for correlations between internal and 
external conflict. The entanglement in external conflict activities pos-
sibly puts too much strain on the social and political system, thereby 
contributing to an increasing level of domestic conßict and insta-
bility. In this case one wouJd also expect a positive correlation between 
indicators of internal and external conßict. But a different causal model 
would be needed in order to explain these correlations. 
In this article the problem of causality will be left aside even though 
the mainstream of theoreticaJ reasoning is based on causal arguments 
as outlined above, i.e., domestic conßict leads to foreign conflict be-
havior. lnstead we confine ourselves to the simple question: does in-
ternal conflict correlate with external conflict at all? This restriction 
is necessary for two reasons: first, the extensive literature on this subject 
(Rummel, 1963; Haas, 1965; Tanter, 1966; Wilkenfeld, 1968, 1969. 
1972; FJanigan and Fogelman, 1970; Burrowes and Spector, 1973; 
CoJJins, 1973; Hazelwood, 1973, 1975; Liao, 1976; summaries by 
McGowan and Shapiro, 1973; Zimmerman, 1975, 1976; Zinnes, 1975) 
is full of contradictions and does not yet allow an answer to the question 
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of whether a significant cross-sectional correlation exists. Second, the 
causal explanation of such a corrclation can only be tested adequateJy 
either when reliable time-series of internal and extcrnal conflict data are 
available, or when sufficient data on different known determinants of 
cxternal and internal conflicts are ready for use. For all practical pur-
poses, both kinds of data are required (Weede, 1977). These conditions 
have yet to be met, though it can be said that a first step in this direction 
was made by Gurr and Duvall (1973; criticized by Weede, f975b). 
Whatever the causal structure of the rclation between intemal and 
external conflict might be, we arc primarily intercsted in the correlation 
between a country's intemal conflict and its external conflict behavior. 
This excludes a focus on countries becoming the targets of f oreign con-
flict activities by other nations, i.c., suff ering from foreign intervention, 
due to their internal conflict. Although that proposition has already 
been investigated quantitatively (Doran, 1976; Gurr and Duvall, 1973; 
Odell, 1974; Pearson, 1974; Weede, 1975a, 1978) and seems tobe prom-
ising, it will be ignored in this article. 
The most salient result in the literature on the relation between in· 
ternal and external conflict is found in Rummel's 1963 paper. There he 
analyzed in a cross-national setting the relation between nine external 
conflict indicators and 13 domestic conflict indicators during the mid-
fifties. Using standard exploratory factor analysis (for the technique 
see Harman, 1967; Rummel, 1970), he extracted three factors of internal 
and three factors of external conflict, the intemal conflict factors being 
uncorrelated with the external conflict factors. From this result and 
from a follow-up regression analysis, Rummel concluded that external 
conflicts are independent of internal conflicts and that, contrary to 
theoretical expectations, no systematic relation between both types of 
conflicts existed. The replication study by Tanter (1966) using data 
from 1958-1960, basically supported Rummel's findings. Research in 
the following years evoked some doubts regarding Rummel's findings. 
Scholars such as Wilkenfeld (1968, 1969), Burrowesand Spector(l973), 
Collins (1973), Copson (1973) and Liao (1976) analyzed the relation-
ship between internal and external conflict for separate groups of 
countries or even for individual countries over time. Sometimes, but 
not always. a significant correlation between internal and external 
conflict emerged. 
There are several reasons for not pursuing such a restrictive research 
strategy. Rummel and Tantcr analyzed a much more general problem 
than many of their successors. lf we find a relation between internal and 
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external conflict over aJJ countries, thus contradicting Rummel and 
Tanter, such a result would have greater theoretical weight than one 
valid only for specific countries, because correlations for single coun-
tries or groups of countries can hardly be generalized. lt is impossible to 
use them for systematic explanatory purposes. Evidence of this can be 
seen in McGowan and Shapiro's ( 1973: 80) findings, which sought to 
summarize the research in this field: "For certain classes of nations, 
there is a positive relationship between certain types of domestic conflict 
and certain types of foreign conflict behavior at one point in time." 
Frequently, studies focusing on specific nations or groups of nations 
suffer from an insufficient num ber of cases and / or Jack of independence 
of observations because of autocorrelation. Therefore doubts about 
the robustness and replicability of these results are justified. 
Our basic aim in the following analysis is the attempt to replicate 
Rummel's classical findings for the years 1966-1967, i.e., to determine 
whether internal conflicts and the domestic instability ofnations induce 
them to engage in external conflict activities. In other words, is there a 
correlation between internal and external conflicts over all nations? 
Even though in general the results of quantitative research confirm 
Rummel's rejection of the externalization hypothesis, Hazelwood's 
( 1975) objection still stands. He argues that most analyses supporting 
Rummel's findings used data from the late fifties. Therefore the ex-
ternalization hypothesis may still be compatible with events in other 
years or decades.1 
From a methodological point ofview a replication study is meaning-
ful. lt is questionable whether exploratory factor analysis as used by 
Rummel is the best technique for analyzing the externalization hypothe-
sis. 2 Exploratory factor analysis does not necessarily have to, but may, 
produce misleading results (Weede and Jagodzinski, 1977). Choosing 
an orthogonal or a moderately oblique rotation amounts to an a priori 
bias in favor of a solution allowing the rejection of the externalization 
hypothesis. Furthermore, if such solutions ex ist, as Rummel ( 1963) 
l. lf our rcsults for thc sixties were different from Rummel's ( 1963) for the fifties wc 
woutd have to ask why the externalization hypothesis holds in the first instance and why 
it fails in thc sccond. Furthcr steps would thcn be rcquired to specify the conditions vali-
dating thc hypothcsis. 
2. As will be shown. our critique of Rummel's method focuscs primarily on the use of 
orthogonal factor analysis and not so much on his rcgression procedurc which uses only 
crudely estimated factor scores. EspeciaUy crude estimation of factor scores might, under 
some conditions, lead to oblique factors. Using both regression, with crudely estimatcd 
factor scorcs, and confirmatory factor analysis on our data, wc get similar results. 
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showed for his data set, it is conceivable that there are different solutions 
for other data sets which also provide for significant corrclations be-
tween internal and external conflict factors. If this is the case, tbe ques-
tion to ask is which solution is more meaningf ul in tenns of substance. 
Furthermore, one would ha ve to ask wbich is theoretically more satis-
factory. In other words, tbe problem would consist of producing factor 
analytic results based on substantive arguments instead of relying cx-
clusively on mathematical and aesthetic criteria. One would also have 
to ask which solution is more parsimonious and easier to test and which 
applies "Occam's razor," i.e., the principle of "explicanda non sunt 
multiplicanda praeter necessitatem." To answer these questions, con-
firmatory factor analysis in our view is the adequate technique to be 
used (Jöreskog, 1969; Jöreskog et al., 1970; Jöreskog and Sorbom, 
1976; Costner and Schoenberg, 1973; Weede, 1977; Weede and Jagod-
zinski, 1977). 
We will try to replicate Rummefs study with data for the years 1966-
1967. The empirical results relevant to the theoretical discussion will 
be produced by exploratory factor analysis and regression analysis on 
the one band and by confirmatory factor analysis on the othcr. We hope 
to contribute thereby to the solution of an important problem linking 
international politics with comparative politics as weil as to demonstrate 
the potential of confirmatory factor analysis for empirical research. 
THE DATA SET 
To test the hypothesis that a systematic and replicable relationship 
between domestic and extemal conflict behavior valid for all nations 
does not exist, we must fulfill two requirements. First, the data set has 
tobe as universal as possible. Second, following Hazelwood (1975), the 
data should not cover the late fifties because this period has been ana-
Iyzed in most studies so far. 
The final selection of the data has been determined by the data sets 
available: the domestic conflict variables come from the World Hand-
book of Political and Social lndicators 11 (Taylor and Hudson, 1972); 
the external conflict variables are taken from McC/elland's Wor/d 
Event lnteral'lion Survey {WEIS). l The external conflict data are avail-
3. In contrast to the World Hondhuult. II. the WEIS data arc not availahle in printed 
form. Wc obtained these data from the lnter-Univcrsity Consortium for Political and 
Social Research thruugh the assistance of the Z.Cntralarchiv in Cologne. The lC PSR study 
numbcr for WEIS is 7513, for the Worid Ha'1dbook 111522. 
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able beginning with 1966, the domestic conflict data ending 1967. The 
temporal domain is thus determined by the intersection of both data 
sets, the years 1966-1967:' The units of analysis, the nations as actors 
and not as targets, were chosen accordingly. The Wor/d Handbook lists 
domestic conflict data for 136 political units; WEIS reports external 
conflict events for 159 actors. The intersection of both lists consists of 
125 nations. None of the greater sovereign countries is missing, nor are 
there missing data.s 
WEIS reports events data that purportedly describc foreign policy 
behavior of states. They are used to explain, and in a long-term perspec-
tive (Burgess, 1975) they are intended tobe used in the prediction of the 
international system•s interaction dynamics. McClelland ( 1972: 38) 
defines events as 0 officiat government acts reported as separate items 
of international conduct.„ The events thus defined are the means whereby 
states try to influence others. McClelland differentiales between event/ 
interaction on the one band and transaction on the other. While events 
are by definition single, discrete, and nonroutinized acts, transactions 
stand for continuous and routinizcd behavior.6 
As the unit of analysis is the nation as actor, the external conflict 
indicators measure the frequency of conflict activities of the 125 nations. 7 
We have eliminated all the events from the data set reporting conflict 
4. Basically, two alternatives are available: eithcr to aggregate the data for the wholc 
two-year period and then compute the correlations cross-sectionally, or toaggregate them 
into two one-ycar periods, thus obtaining two cross-sectional data blocks, allowing the 
computation of lagged correlations betwcen internal and external confiict variables. 
Choosing the greater aggregation period, as we did, has the advantage of more reliable 
measurement of the indicators but thc disadvantage of bcing unable to systematically 
detect the dominant causal influence either from intemal to external connict with Heise's 
( 1970) procedure as implied by the externalization hypothesis, or vice versa. Becausc 
information on the type and duration of the time lag would be necessary. this aspect is not 
considercd in this article. 
5. As Mack ( 1975: 605) pointed out, the absence of missing data in events data sets 
is likely to be spurious rather than real. A zero score may either rcfer to a country where a 
certain type of evcnt did not happen, or to a country where it did happen but was not re-
ported. While this problem undoubtedly exists, littlc can bc done. Or any eure might be as 
bad as or worse than the illness itself. Therefore, we proceed a.r {f there were no missing 
data. 
6. This differcntiation and the fact that transactions in the WEISdata set are Jeft out, 
has the consequence that all continuous aspects of the Vietnam war are ignored. Nonethe-
less Vietnam is still a dominant field of conflict, not only for the regional actors, but also 
for the superpower United States. 
7. Besides conflict indicators the WEIS data set also contains indicators on partici· 
patory and cooperat1ve event interactions. These are irrelevant to our research problem. 
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directed at insurgents, e.g., the Viet Cong, the Pathet Lao, the PLO, 
Biafra. Classifyingas external these events which the respective govcm-
ments consider as intcrnal would have meant a built-in bias in favor of 
the extcrnalization hypothesis.• 
The externaJ conflict beha vior of the 125 nations is describcd by 12 
variables. These variables consist of the WEIS combined evcnts.9 Even 
though thc conflict variables could, according to tbe coding rulcs. bc 
used in a more disaggregated form (McClelland and Hoggard, 1969), 
we dccided to use them at a higher level of aggrcgation. Wc tbercby 
come closcr to Rummers (1963) rcpresentation. lt must be rccallcd that 
Rummel (1963) and McClelland use different variable definitions and 
coding rules. There is a degree of similarity betwcen the two {e.g., for 
accusations), but there are also great diffcrences {as in the case of "use 
of military force"). This is not nccessarily a disadvantage. With Blalock 
( 1968) we may speak of different auxiliary theories implicit in thc coding 
procedurcs. Both authors use abstract conccpts that can bc measurcd 
and counted differently. Neither for Rummel nor for most other investi-
gators are these auxiliary theories part of the externalization hypothesis. 
Our choice of auxiliary assumptions for thc operationalization should 
hardly affect the basic relations we are primarily interested in.10 
The diffcrences in the data collection procedures followed by Rummel 
and McClclland should not represent a fundamental obstacle to our 
analysis. Wc are more concerned with some similarity: both Rummel 
and McClelland collected their data primarily from thc New York 
Times. The use of one data source only, instead of several sources from 
as many diff crcnt cultures and regions as possible, crcates in itself con-
siderable measuremcnt problems (Azar et al., 1974; Doran et al., 1973; 
8. Thc implication is not only 1ha1 conflict behavior of governmcnts against „their" 
subversive groups is cxcludcd. but also tbc omission of any conflict activity of third coun-
tries against insurgents. e.g .• the Unitcd States versus the Viet Cong. We thus follow 
Rummel. who took into considcration only conOicts bctween nation states. Furthermore. 
the elimination of the conflict behavior directed against insurgents has no effect on thc 
results worth mentioning, as was revealcd by an analysis undertaken for control purposcs. 
9. The WEIS data set lists 28 different subcategories (events) of conßicts aggrepted 
to 12 categories (combined events). Choosing the subcategories would have reduced the 
numbcr of events per conßict variable. thus incrcasing the risk of greater mcasurement 
error (Weede, 1973). 
10. lf operational definitions had a great influencc on the test of the externali1.ation 
hypothesis. this would have required determining systematically these effects in order to 
overcome the ad hoc character of the operationalization schemes. 
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Hazelwood and West. 1974; Sigler, 1972)." Especially for very rare 
events, like some of our conflict indicator measures (seeTable 1), skewed 
distributions and distortions due to measurement errors may have 
disastrous consequcnces (Abelson and Tukey, 1970; Weede, 1973). 
Tablc 1 shows twelve indicators of international conflict activities-
seven for verbal conflict and five for nonverbal conflict behavior. All 
have a minimum of 0, a relatively low mean. but a high maximum. 
This is indicative of very skewed distributions and severe outlier prob-
lems. As is weil known, skewed distributions and outliers produce very 
unstable relations between the variables. These correJations may, under 
specific circumstanccs, be determined by a very f ew or even single cases 
(Abelson and Tukey. 1970; Blalock, 1960: 290; Weede. 1973). To reduce 
the impact of the distribution, we have transformed all cxtcrnal conflict 
variables by adding one to each value, then computing its natural 
logarithm.12 The result is that the skewness in distribution is, in fact, 
reduced for all the variables. ll At the same time the outliers come closer 
to the other cases. 
Rummel (1963) bad chosen a different transformation procedure, a 
grouping procedure, leadingto comparable results. The methodological 
objection (Blalock, 1964, 1970; Doreian, 1972) to such a grouping pro-
cedure is that it leads to only a few categories. Our transformation 
procedure, while having an intent similar to Rummel's, avoids artificial 
discontinuities and the resulting measurement errors. Neither the dif-
ferent variable definitions and coding rules, nor the different transfor-
mation proccdures should lead to substantially different results. 
The indicators of internal conflict are listed in Table 2. They are taken 
from the World Handbook o/ Political and Social lndica1ors l/(Taylor 
and Hudson, 1972). According to the authors, they can be interpreted 
as a "typology of protest behavior on a figurative spectrum of intensity, 
ranging f rom the relatively normal and legitimate demonstration ... to 
11. There is an ongoing systematic discu.~sion about source rcliability and measurc-
ment crror in event data sets. Bccause of the contradictory findings of A1.ar et al. ( 1972), 
the skewed distribution of the variables, and susceptibility to measurement error in the 
conflict indicators (Weede, 1973), we arc rather sceptical about Hoggard's ( 1975: 26) opti-
mistic vicw: "McClelland's original studies and more recent analyscs of crises seem to 
indicate that the paucity of data problem is not as severe when dealing with conßict 
phenomena." 
12. The addition of the value of 1 to the conflict variables prior to thc logarithmic 
transformation is neccssary bccause the logarithm for l.ero values is undefincd. 
13. Prior to the logarithmic transformation, skewness varies bctween 3.42 (TH R EA T) 
and 8. 73 (DENY); after the transformation betwecn 1.07 (ACCUSE) and 2.72 (DENY). 
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TADLE 1 
lndicator List: Extemal Conflict 
Verba/ Conjlict: Hvent Frequencie1 Total= 2179 
Mean 
Rl::JECT 
ACCUSE 
PROTEST 
DENY 
DEMAND 
WARN 
THREAT 
2.7 
9.5 
1.5 
0.9 
0.9 
1.3 
0.6 
Conflict Behavior: Event Frequencie1 Total= 952 
DEMONSTRATE 
REDUCE 
EXPEL 
SEIZE 
FORCE 
1.4 
2.1 
0.7 
1.0 
2.4 
Maximum 
42 
198 
33 
42 
17 
29 
8 
33 
52 
12 
17 
73 
NOTE: These 12 conflict indicators are the „combined events" from the WEIS data 
set. The minimum for all variables is 0. Minimum, mcan, and maximum refer to the 
raw data of all 125 nations for the period analyzed (1966-1967). 
TADLE 2 
lndicator List: Internal Conflict 
DOMESTIC PROTEST 
STRIKES 
RIOTS 
ATTACKS 
Dl::A THS FROM POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE 
ASSASSINATIONS 
COUPS 
Mean 
6.3 
1.3 
8.7 
36.7 
5236 
0.24 
0.31 
Maximum 
239 
17 
34.4 
1473 
525492 
6 
4 
NOTE: The 7 intemal conflict indicators are from the World Handbook II (Taylor 
and Hudson, 1972). The minimum is 0 for all variables. Minimum, mean and maxi-
mum refer to the raw data for all 125 states in the period analyzed (1966-1967). 
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the comparatively subversive or revolutionary violence of the armed 
attack." Because the Wor/d Handbook is easily available, a more de-
tailed discussion of the indicators is unnecessary. lt is important to 
mention the fact that the World Handbook II uses regional sources in 
addition to the New York Times and the Associated Press.•4 
The Wor/d Handbook II indicators, "successful coups," "unsuccess-
ful coups," and "assassinations," are not used in the original form. 
lnspired by Rummel's indicator "number of revolutions," we added the 
number of coup attempts, both "successful" and "unsuccessful" (note 
that the outcome of coups is irrelevant to the problem at hand). The 
indicator "assassinations" has an extremely skewed distribution. lt has 
a value different from zero for only 17 nations. "Assassinations" are 
such an intensive form of domestic violence that the exact frequency is 
less important than the actual occurrence. For the evaluation of the 
climate of domestic violence the difference between one political murder 
and none is greater than the diff erence between one murder and six, 
the maximum in our data set. We therefore dichotomized "assassina-
tions" so that all the values different from zero get a value of one. Be-
cause the internal conflict indicators have very skewed distributions 
and outliers, they were transformed by the same logarithmic procedures 
used for the external conflict indicators. ts 
In addition to the external and internal conflict variables we use 
"population size" as listed by Taylor and Hudson ( 1972) as an indicator 
in some of our analyses. One can argue that the greater the population, 
the more frequent the occurrence of protest demonstrations or armed 
attacks will be. Ten demonstrations may be very significant in Luxem-
burg, but quite irrelevant in the United States. Moreover, great powers 
in general are more heavily invoJved in external conflicts(e.g., Richard-
son, 1960; Singerand Small, 1972; Weede, 1975a; Wright, 1965; Bremer, 
1978). Using this variable we can determine whether the correlations 
between internal and external conflict indicators are spurious due to 
effects of population size. This procedure is the first step away from 
simple correlation analysis in the direction of causal dependence analysis. 
14. For funher information consult Appendix Jot WtJr/J Hondhook II. lrrcspect1ve 
of the attempt to increase the reliability of the data, scepticism and doubts are in order. To 
give just one example: while Ploetz ( 1973: 200) reports 30,000 deaths in the Ibo massacres 
in Northern Nigeria for October 1966, alone, Taylor and Hudson ( 1972: 111) list only 
4,200 deaths due to inlemal connicts in Nigeria for the whole year 1966. 
1 S. Prior to the logarithmic transformation skewness varies betwcen 2.59 (COUPS) 
and I0.6 (DEATHS), after the transformation between 1.12 (A TT ACKS) and 3.01 
(ASSASSINATIONS). 
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EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 
In the exploratory factor analysis of the WEIS data forexternal con-
flict behavior 1966--1967 and the World Handbook data for internal 
conflict, the procedure employed by Rummel (1963) is followed as 
closely as possiblc. Wc therefore ran separate principaJ component 
analyses for the seven internal conflict indicators and the J 2 external 
conflict indicators. 
For the external conflict indicators only one factor with an eigenvalue 
greater than 1.00 can be extracted. This analysis is not reported here in 
detail. All loadings exceed . 70. Our indicators for internal conflict cover 
a behavior pattern similar to that found in Rummel's study. In a first 
analysis we extract only two factors with an eigenvalue greater than 
1.00. Because Rummel reports three factors we forced the extraction 
of the same number of factors in the f ollow-up principal component 
analysis. The result after the orthogonal rotation of the axes according 
to the varimax criterion is reported in Table 3. lt shows the utility of 
extracting three factors. The pattern is very similar to Rummel's. About 
77% of the variance is explained. The first factor is labeled PROTEST 
because all the indicators measuring demonstrative acts with a low level 
of physical violence load high on it. Nearly half of the variance is ex-
plained by this factor. Tbc three indicators measuring violent forms of 
internal conflict load high on the second factor. We therefore call it 
VIOLENCE. The indicator ATT ACKS has a similarly high loading on 
the factors PROTEST and VIOLENCE. Therefore the exploratory 
factor analysis reported in Table 3 neither allows us to assign definitively 
each of the indicators to one and only one factor nor permits us to draw 
a sharp line betwcen PROTEST and VIOLEN CE. The third dimension, 
COUPS, is described by thc indicator of the same name, measuring 
successful and unsuccessful coups. 
The exploratory factor analysis, as reported in Table 3, does not lead 
to a very clear-cut and simple structure; there is no unambiguous rela-
tion between indicators and factors. DEA TH loads about the same on 
all three factors, even though from a substantive point ofview, it should 
be clearly relatcd to the VIOLENCE factor. Given the different sets of 
variables. and the use of standardized values (Mulaik, 1972: 356), a 
straightforward comparison of our international conflict factor struc~ 
ture with Rummel's is not possible. Nevertheless our PROTEST factor 
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TADLE 3 
Factor Analysis of the Internat Conflict lndicators 
Orthogonal Rotation 
(Varlmax) FactoTI 
Jndlcat<m PROTEST Y/01.ENC/f COUPS Communlllitit1 
RIOTS 0.86 0.10 0.21 0.80 
DOMESTIC PROTESTS 0.86 0.08 . 0.06 0.74 
STRIKES 0.77 0.10 -0.07 0.61 
ATTACKS 0.60 0.51 0.34 0.80 
ASSASSINA l'IONS 0.00 0.93 0.05 0.86 
DEATHS 0.39 0.51 0.48 0.70 
COUPS -0.05 0.12 0.93 0.88 
Sum uf ruws: 
% Variancc cxplained 47.6 28.8 23.6 100.0 
% Total variance 36.7 22.2 18.2 77.1 
shares a certain similarity with Rummcrs TURMOIL factor.' 6 The 
COUP dimension corrcsponds quite exactly to his REVOLUTION-
ARY factor. Indicators having high loadingson ourVIOLENCE factor 
have correspondingly high loadings on Rummcl's SUBVERSIVE di-
mens1on. 
Following Rummel's procedure we report the factor analysis using 
all of the 19 indicators where an eigenvalue greater than 1.00 is used as 
an cxtraction criterion. Table 4 shows that the orthogonal rotation 
leads to a similar factor structure as was the case in the two separate 
principal component analyses. All thc WEIS indicators load high on a 
common factor for external conflict (abbreviated EXCON). Once mon: 
we extract a PROTEST and a VIOLEN CE factor with COUPS loading 
on the latter. Surprisingly enough. A IT ACK.S again is not clearly 
assigned to any one of the internal conßict factors, PROTEST or VIO-
LENCE. However. all the indicators are definitively associated with 
either the external or thc two internal conflict factors. 
16. Rummel (1963) uscs nine domestic connicl indicators. Assassinations. gcneral 
strikes, major govcrnmcnt crises. riots. and antigovernment demonslralions hnc: loadinp 
greater than O.SO on his turmoil factor. Our domestic protest indicator corresponds 
roughly to his antigovernment demonstrations indicator. Riots and strikes also have high 
loadings on our protest factor. Instead of assa$Sinations loading high on the protest fac-
tor, which is thc result of Rummel's analysis, armed auacks has a high loading on PRO-
TEST. 
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TABLE4 
Factor Analysis of Interna! and External Conflict Indicators 
Orthogonally Rotated 
(Varimax) Factors 
lndicator:s PROTEST VIOLEN CE EXCON Communalitier 
RIOTS 0.78 0.27 0.25 0.75 
DOMESTIC PROTESTS 0.83 0.03 0.24 0.75 
STRIKES 0.73 0.07 0.21 0.58 
ATIACKS 0.54 0.67 0.22 0.80 
ASSASSINATIONS 0.12 0.69 -0.08 0.49 
DEAIBS 0.36 0.15 0.10 0.71 
COUPS -0.20 0.70 0.15 0.56 
REJECT 0.23 0.00 0.82 0.72 
ACCUSE 0.08 0.12 0.86 0.76 
PROTEST 0.23 -0.03 0.82 0.72 
DENY 0.18 -0.02 0.79 0.66 
DEMAND 0.18 0.00 0.83 0.72 
WARN 0.17 0.00 0.87 0.78 
THREAT 0.08 0.13 0.77 0.62 
DEMONSTRATE 0.34 -0.08 0.67 0.57 
RE DU CE 0.16 o.os 0.80 0.67 
EXPEL 0.22 0.20 0.65 0.52 
SEIZE 0.04 0.28 0.75 0.64 
FORCE 0.13 0.23 0.70 0.57 
Sum ofrows: 
% Variance explained 21.6 18.0 60.4 100.0 
% Total variance 14.3 1 l.9 39.9 66.1 
We are interested in the interdependence of domestic and foreign 
conflict behavior of nations. Such a relationship, if it exists, may pro-
duce either correlations between domestic and foreign conflict factors 
in an oblique solution or loadings of domestic conflict indicators on 
the foreign conflict factor, and loadings of forcign conßict indicators 
on some domestic conflict factor (Weede and Jagodzinski, 1977). In our 
enforced orthogonal solution (Table 4) only one our of 12 indicators of 
foreign conflict (DEM ONSTRA TE) loads higher than .30 on one of the 
domestic conflict factors. None of thc scven indicators of domestic 
conflict has a loading of .30 or above on the EXCON factor. These 
results replicate Rummel's (1963) findings. The rotated dimcnsions 
clearly distinguish between domestic and foreign conflict. Thcre is no 
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reason to call into question Rummel's ( 1963: 17) earJy finding: "there 
may be little reJationship between domestic and foreign conflict be-
havior." 
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 
In principaJ component analysis, which is a special kind of explora-
tory factor analysis. only the selection of indicators may a priori influ-
ence the theoretical meaning of factors. The relationship between oper-
ational measures (indicators) and the theoretical concepts (factors) is 
left to the calculation procedure. We doubt (Armstrong, 1967; Weede 
and Jagodzinski, 1977) that this is an optimal strategy of theory con-
struction. Confirmatory factor analysis instead allows, and even re-
quires, first, theory-guidance, because of the necessity to define first 
the number of theorctical variables (factors); second, to specify a priori 
the relationships between indicators and factors, and third, to select 
some factor loadings which are to be set at zero. ' 7 
A first model for confirmatory factor analysis is specified in agree-
ment with the results from the separate exploratory factor analyses for 
internal and external conflict. This allows us to estimate the correlations 
among the three factors of internal and the one factor of external con-
flict as well as the respective indicator loadings. In general. we specif y 
all indicators having high Joadings on a specific factor in the principal 
component analysis to load on this factor alone. The solution has been 
constrained in such a way as to produce equally high loadings of AT-
T ACKS and DEA THS on the VIOLEN CE factor. For theoretical 
reasons we split EXCON into a verbal (VERBEXCON) and a non-
verbal (NONVERBEXCON) conflict dimension. The result is a some-
what better fit between model and data. 
As mentioned above we assume external and internal conflict activi-
ties to be related to the size of a nation. •8 We thus introduce into the 
modeJ as a sixth factor free of measurement error the population size 
17. In order to get a model with identifiable parameters, some or these have tobe fixed 
before starting the analysis. Most often, researchers fix some factor loadings at zero. So 
do we. Sometimes, one fixes loadings at one. In principle, one might choose any numerical 
value, e.g., a value drawn from previous empirical research. 
18. Population is a conccpt that theoretically represents onc aspect or a nation's power 
relevant to its external conflict behavior (Richardson, 1960; WriRht, 1965; Singer and 
Small, 1972; Weede, 1975a). As Hibbs ( 1973) shows, there is also a close relationship 
between population size and at least some types or internal conflict. 
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of a country. Besides obtaining the correlations among the conflict 
factors we also rneasure the extent to which they are related to POPU· 
LATION. For comparison purposes, we also run another analysis with· 
out POPULATION. The main results are hardly affected thereby: the 
correlations between the factors are fairly stable, whether POPULA· 
TION is included or excluded. Contrary to the approach of exploratory 
factor analysis, we allow the factors to be correlated with one another. 
Given all these assumptions we compute those 17 factor loadings which 
differ from .0 to 1.0 and which are not fixed a priori (see Table 5), and 
the correlations among the oblique factors (see Table 6) with ACOVSF 
(Jöreskog et al., 1970). The factor loadings in Table 5 can be interpreted 
as standardized regression or path coefficients where the factors (col· 
umns) are the independent, and the indicators (rows) are the dependent 
variables. The squared factor loadings give the amount of variance in 
the indicators that is determined by the factor (communality). Table 5 
implies that most of the indicators have a communality greater than 
50%. The only exception here is ASSASSINATIONS, which has only 
a low loading on VIOLENCE. Comparing Tables 3 and S we notice 
not only changing factor loadings but also a different rank ordering of 
the indicators in terms of their loadings. 
More interesting to our research problem are the correlations be-
tween internal and cxternal conflict factors (Table 6). The three internal 
conflict factors correlate between .11 and .59 with the two external con-
flict factors. 19 We can therefore conclude that not all aspects of internal 
conflict are unrelated to external conflict. In general, nonverbal external 
conflict activities (NONVERBEXCON) correlate more highly with 
internal conßict than verbal external conflict (VERBEXCON), a fact 
to be interpreted cautiously given the size of the correlations. 
Furthermore, PROTEST correlates more strongly with external 
conflict than does VIOLENCE, and the latter correlates higher with 
external conflict than COUPS. In any case, our confirmatory factor 
analysis reveals a pronounced relationship between internal PROTEST 
and external conflict behavior. 
19. To assess thc relationship between internal and external conOict we could also 
look at the correlations between the indicators instead of thosc between the factors. The 
effect would be the systematic underestimation of the relationship becausc random mea-
surement errors reduce the correlations between the indicators. Confirmatory factor 
analysis not only tests the assumption of random measurement error. but also corrects for 
it. The correction amounts to looking at the relationships bctwccn the factors rat her than 
at those between the indicators (Werts et al., 1974; Weede and Jagodzinski, 1977). 
\:! 
~ 
TABLE S 
Factor Loadings from the One-l.evel Confinnatory Factor Analysis 
PROTEST V/Oll:'NCJ;' COUPS VERBEXCON NONYERBEXCON POPULATION 
DOMESTIC PROTESTS 
STRIKES 
RIOTS 
AITACKS 
ASSASSlNATIONS 
DEATHS 
COUPS 
REJECT 
ACCUSE 
PROTESi 
Dt:NY 
DEMAND 
WARN 
THREAT 
Dt::MONSTR.A TE 
REDlJCk 
EXPEL 
SEIZI:: 
FORCE 
POPULATION 
0.77 
0.66 
0.86 
0.9\ 
0.34 
0.91 
l .()() 
0.85 
0.85 
0.84 
0.79 
0.83 
0.87 
0.15 
NOTE: (1) 0.0 factor loadinga are not füte.d for the bettcr vilualization of the simple suucture; 
(2) all 0.0 and all 1.0 loadings are fixed; 
(3) loadings of attacks and deaths wcre con\trained tobe equal; 
0.11 
0.19 
0.69 
o.n 
o.n 
(4) the factor loadings are tobe considered &! standardizcd repession or path coefficients; and 
(5) thc resuJts have becn computed with ACOVSF according to the least ~uares criterion. 
1.00 
TABLE. 6 
Correlations Among the Oblique First-Order Factors for the 
One-Step Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
PROTEST VIOLENC€ COUPS VERBEXCON NONVERBEXCON 
PROTEST 1.00 
VJOLENCE 0.61 l.00 
COUl>S 0.08 0.37 1.00 -
VERBEXCON o.so ().3() 0.11 1.00 
NONV~RfSEXC()N ().S~ ().4() 0.24 0.97 1.00 
~-----------------------POPULATION 0.63 0.41 o.oa 0.51 0,58 
- - ... ,,,__..... - - - ----~ - --- ~ 
\;! -
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Furthermore, Table 6 shows verbal and nonverbal external conflict 
activities to have a correlation of. 97. Given the range of the correlations 
between the three intcmal conflict factors, however, (minimum .08, 
maximum .61) internal conflict seems tobe a more complex and differ-
entiated phenomenon than international conflict. 
The model specified fits the data weil. The quantitative evidence is 
provided by the matrix of the residuals, that is, the matrix of the differ-
ences between the observed and the implied correlations and the vari-
ances of the model. According to the common . IO criterion the quality 
of the model can be evaluated in terms of the number of absolute differ-
ences greater than . l 0. Our model misses this limit in only 20 out of 190 
cases with a maximum residual difference of .17. Thus the observed 
correlations between the indicators are reproduced quite weil. 
There are other and similar models fitting the data even better. lf, for 
example, one would constrain the loading of A TT ACKS or DEATHS 
on VIOLEN CE at 1.0, the number of absolute differences greater than 
. l would decrease further without changing considerably the theoreti-
cally relevant correlations between the factors. Yet this would imply 
the untenable assumption of A IT ACKS or DEA THS to be free of 
measurement error. No further adjustment of the model has been at-
tempted because it would only lead to slightly improved models out of 
a whole class of comparable models, while the danger of "overfitting" 
would increase, thus producing nonreplicable results. 
Because confirmatory factor analysis in general, as weil as in our 
case, produces first-ord~r oblique factors, the idea that the relationship 
between the first-order factors can be traced back to relationships be-
tween second-ordcr factors is certainly not far-fetched. We do not dis-
tinguish any more between two levels of abstraction, between measur-
able indicators and abstract terms, but between three such levels. We 
have decidcd to combine the threc internal and the two external conflict 
factors respectively into a second-order factor each. In doing this we 
assume VERBEXCON and NONVERBEXCON to be related with 
equal intensity to the second-order factor EXCON, while the three 
internal conflict factors PROTEST, VIOLENCE and COUPS are re-
lated to the second-order factor INCON. In the case of the POPU-
LATION indicator, first-order and second-order factors are identical. 
The results of this hierarchical analysis can be described by three 
matrices20: one matrix of the loadings ofthe indicators on the first-order 
20. To be precise, two more matrices (or vectors} are needed. one for the error vari-
.ances of the indicators and one for the error variances of the first-order factors (sec 
Jöreskog et al .• 1970). 
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factors, one of the loadings of the first-order factors on the second-order 
factors, and, finally, one of the correlations between the second-order 
factors. lf the calculation for the hierarchical factor analysis is per-
formed in one step only-as we have done-the matrix of indicator 
loadings on the first-order factors will usually deviate from the com-
parative matrix computed in the nonhierarchical analysis. 
This is true in our case as weil. As deviations from Table 5 are mini-
mal, however, we do not report them here. Table 7 gives the matrix of 
loadings of first-order factors on second-order factors; Table 8 presents 
the correlations between the second-order factors. 
According to Table 7, PROTEST loads very high on the second-
order conflict factor INCON. VIOLENCE moderately high, with 
COUPS loading only very moderately. The dominant loading of PRO-
TEST, on INCON indicates that PROTEST is the most frequent form 
of internal conflict. All the other loadings reported in Table 7 are con-
strained. For the highest level of abstraction, on which the externaliza-
tion hypothesis is usually discussed, Table 8 is the most interesting one. 
lt shows the relationship between internal (INCON) and external 
(EXCON) conflict summarized in one correlation only. lts value of0.56 
is impressive: INCON and EXCON share more than 30% common 
variance! 
The question now is whether our hierarchical model fits the data set 
as weil as the nonhierarchical model. In general, we have to expect a 
rise in the discrepancies between observed and model-implied correla-
tions if an additional lcvel of abstraction is added. Instcad of getting 20 
residuals above .10 we now have 25, with two cases even cxcceding the 
.20 threshold. The abstract and, at the same time, parsimonious descrip-
tion of the hierarchical model has to be paid for by somewhat reduced 
accuracy. 
Exploratory factor analysis, using all the internal and external con-
fiict indicators (Table 4), as well as confirmatory factor analysis, repro-
duce satisfactorily the correlations between the indicators. A fatal 
theoretical problem arises in that the solutions contradict each other. 
While confirmatory factor analysis supports the externalization hy-
pothesis, the results from exploratory factor analysis do not. We prefer 
the rcsults derived from confirmatory factor analysis because of thc 
greater confidencc we have in this procedure. Several reasons can be 
given to support this decision: 
( 1) Only confirmatory factor analysis allows the translation of the theoretical sub-
stance of the cxternaliT.ation hypothesis into a model. This substancc is rcflected 
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TABLE 7 
Loadings of the First-Order Factors on the Second.Order Factors 
Resulting from the Hierarchical Factor Analysis 
PROTEST 
VIOLENCE 
COUPS 
VERBEXCON 
NONVERBEXCON 
POPULATION 
NOTE: 
JNCON 
0.95 
0.64 
0.25 
EXCON 
0.98 
0.98 
POPULATION 
1.00 
(l) 0.0 factor loadings are not listed to better vi.sualiz.e the simple structure; 
(2) all the 0.0 and 1.0 loadings are fixed; 
(3) loadings for VERBEXCON and NONVERBEXCON on EXCON were con-
strained tobe equal; and 
(4) the factor loadings are to be interpreted as standaidized regression or path 
coefficients, the results having been computed by ACOVSF according to the 
least squares criterion. 
ICON 
TADLE 8 
Correlations Among the Second-Order Factors Resulting 
from the Hierarchical Factor Analysis 
JNCON EXCON POPULATION 
EXCON 
POPULATION 
1.00 
0.56 
0.68 
1.00 
0.58 1.00 
in the parsimonious and unambiguous association of indicators and factors as 
determined by the researcher. A comparable theory-guided procedure is not possi-
ble in exploratory factor analysis. 
(2) On substantial grounds the rcsults of the confirmatory factor analysis are morc 
plausible than those of the exploratory factor analysis. The former implics a rela-
tionship between f actors from which mcasurement error has been eliminated. The 
lauer still has many external indicators marginally dependent on intcrnal factors, 
and internal indicators marginally dependcnt on cxternal factors. All these low 
loadings cannot be interpreted easily. 
(3) By choosing an orthogonal solution in exploratory factor analysis we have, by 
implication, made an a priori decision against thc cxtcrnalization hypothesis. The 
best we can get is a factor structure not unequivocally interpretable in terms of 
intcrnal and extcrnal conflict factors. The confirmatory oblique solution, how-
ever, allows thc data to confirm or disconfirm our hypothesis. 
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(4) Furthermore. by confirmatory factor analysis we can directly test the orthogo-
nality assumption by constraining the correlations bctween the factors at 1ero. We 
can then sec whcther the implications of such a modcl are compatiblc with the 
initial corrclation matri>r.. This is in fact nol the case.21 
(5) Exploratory factor analysis is easily subjecl to misinterpretations. Loadings 
smaller than .30 or .SO are usually not takcn into account when interprcting the 
results. lf we ignore thc many small factor loadinp, the interpreted part of the 
cxploratory factor solution will no longer sufficiently reproduce the corrclations 
between the indicators. Thereforc a rcstricted interpretation of the exploratory 
solution is dangerous since it might create the wrong impression that a parsimoni-
ous orthogonal solution would fit the data e4ually weil as a parsimonious oblique 
solution.!! For theoretical reasons. many loadings arc constrained at zero in con-
firmatory factor analysis !.O that an analogous problcm does not cmerge. However, 
the correlations may be reproduced either by a parsimonious oblique solution or 
by an orthogonal solution using considcrably more coefficients. 
THE CORRELATION BETWEEN 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICT: 
REAL OR SPURIOUS? 
Our results for the years 1966-1967 obviously contradict Rummel's 
(1963) and Tanter's (1966) older findings. We have found a relatively 
strong correlation between cxternal and internal conflict for the time 
period analyzed. No similarly high correlation valid for all nations has 
been reported so far. One partial explanation might be that confirma-
tory factor analysis amounts to a "correction for attenuation," that is, 
a correction for the decrease of the correlations due to measurement 
errors (Werts et al„ 1974). 
Without going into detailed causal modeling at the quasi-error-frce 
factor level, the idea expressed above nevertheless suggests that POPU-
LATION. or a nation's size. effects its internal and extern~I conflict 
behavior. Given this assumption, even if external and internal conflict 
behavior are causally independent, we should, due to population effects, 
find a correlation between the conflict factors at the first-order and/ or 
the second-order level. If size alone accounts for the correlations be-
tween internaJ and external conflict, then the partial correlations should 
fall close to zero when we control for POPULATION. 
21. In doing so we have related indicators and factors to cach other a'i we did in Tablc S 
and uscd the same constraints. that is, inserted values of .00, where we did so in Table 5. 
22. In this case "parsimony" means the smallest number of factor loading.-; or corrc-
lations between the factors. different from zero. 
736 JOURNAL OF CONFUCT RESO/.VTION 
Looking first at the influence POPULATION has on the correlation 
between the second-order factors (see Table 8), we see that the correla-
tion between INCON and EXCON is .56 while the partial correlation 
drops to .28 when we control for POPULATION. With regard to the 
correlations between the first-order factors (Table 6), the situation is 
comparable. While the correlation between PROTEST and the two 
external conflict factors is above .5, these values decrease when we con-
trol for POPULATION. The highest partial correlation is .36(Table 9). 
The .40 correlation between VIOLENCE and NONVERBEXCON in 
Table 6 is another interesting correlation from a theoretical point of 
view. The corresponding partial correlation is .18. In other words, the 
introduction of POPULATION as a control variable reduces the previ-
ously reported relatively high and substantively interesting correlations 
to relatively small and uninteresting levels. We don't support ( or repli-
cate) Rummel's zero-order correlation between internal and external 
conflict, but we basically agree with the causal thrust of his conclusion 
with respect to the externalization hypothesis. Our first cautious and 
certainly imperfect step in the direction of causal analysis contradicts 
the hypothesis that internal conflict has a significant influence on ex-
ternal conflict activities. A final judgment as to the causal relationship 
between internal conflict, external conflict, and the size of a nation 
cannot be made on the basis of the partial correlations presented above. 
N onetheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that POPU LA Tl ON has 
an indirect impact on external conflict behavior via a fourth variable, 
for example, the national power potential. 
In order to isolate the global effects of POPULATION, as weil as the 
three internal conflict factors, upon external conflict behavior we run 
two regression analysis. We first calculate factor scores for the 125 
nations for the factors extracted in the two separate principal compo-
nent analyses. This is done by multiplying the standardized values of 
all indicators by their weight on the respective factor and summing them 
up. This step is not identical to Rummel's procedure. He used only 
indicators with high loadings to compute factor scores. 
Regressing the external conflict factor on the three internal conflict 
factors, we notice that the path coefficient from PROTEST to EXCON 
is significantly higher than the other two (see Table IO). When we in-
clude POPULATION in the regression model, the direct effects of 
VIOLENCE and COUPS on EXCON disappear almost completely 
while only a slight effect of PROTEST is left. 
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TABI.E 9 
PartiaJ Correlation Between Intemal and Extemal Conflict 
Controlling for Population 
PROTEST 
VIOLENCE 
COUPS 
VERBEXCON 
0.22 
0.04 
0.08 
NONVERBEXCON 
0.36 
0.18 
0.24 
NOTE: Computed from the correlations betwcen the factors reported in Table 6. 
TABLE 10 
Standardized Coefficients frorn the Regression of EXCON 
on Domestic Conflict and Population 
PROTEST 
COUPS 
VIOLENCE 
POPULATION 
Variance c:itplained (R2 ) 
Witho11t 
Controlling for 
POPULATION 
0.48 
0.17 
0.01 
0.26 
Controlling for 
POPULATION 
0.24 
0.12 
-0.06 
0.42 
0.37 
NOTE: Thc factor 11COres have been computed from the separate principaJ com-
poncnt analyses for external and internal conflict. 
Interpreting these results we have to take into account the fact that 
multicollinearity between PROTEST and POPULATION makes it 
difficult to assess the effect of both variables on the proportion of vari-
ance explained by EXCON. This problem does not emerge in the first 
regression because the factors from a varimax rotated solution do not 
correlate. In addition, we cannot directly compare the results of tbe 
regression with those obtained from confirmatory factor analysis be-
cause the meaning of the theoretical concepts in exploratory factor 
analysis is established along principles different from those used in 
confirmatory factor analysis (Burt, 1976). Disregarding these facts we 
are nevertheless able to draw thc following conclusion for our data sct: 
both regression analysis based on exploratory factor analysis and 
confirmatory factor analysis reveal that the correlations between internal 
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and external conflict factors are largely spurious when control for 
POPULATION is introduced. What is left is a vcry weak relationship 
between PROTEST and EXCON. 
SUMMARY AND OVTLOOK 
Likc Rummel and Tantcr we analyzed the relationship between 
internal conflict and external conßict behavior for all countrics but for 
another time period, for the years 1966-1967. Unlike these two authors, 
we found substantial correlations between internal and external conflict 
for thc middlc of thc sixties, especially expressed in a strong relationship 
betwcen collective protest against the govcrnment and foreign conflict 
activities. This result can be verified by confirmatory factor analysis 
and also by a procedure following Rummel more closely, i.e., using 
factor scores obtained from exploratory factor analysis for regression 
analysis. Rcanalyzing Rummel's own data we could not discover any 
correlation worth mentioning between external and internal conflict, 
irrespective of the technique (confirmatory or cxploratory factor analy-
sis or regression) used. Thus. the considerablc relationship between 
internal and external conflict for the mid-sixties as weil as Rummcl's 
contradictory findings for the late fifties do not arise from the usc of a 
specific mcthod. 
Compared with prcvious findings our bivariate correlations between 
internal and external conflict turn out to be astonishingly high. This 
might be due to pcculiarities of the data sct. We noticed, for example. 
a much higher correlation bctween active and passive conflict involvc-
ment in the WEIS data than in Pearson•s ( 1974) or Taylor and Hudson's 
(1972). For the time period analyzed, actor and target ofuseofFORCE 
in the WEIS data, using all of the l 2S countries, correlatc at . 77, active 
and passive military intervcntion in Pearson's data corrclatc at .38, 
while the comparable value for the World Handbook data is .09. So far, 
no systcmatic research has becn undcrtaken to determine whether this 
is related to systematic crrors in the coding rules or due to measuremcnt 
errors in the various data sets. These differcnccs cannot, howcver, be 
ignored, and users of event data havc not yet paid sufficient attention 
to this problem. Therefore, the consequences for our analysis cannot 
be assessed at present. 
lt might bc necessary to distinguish furthcr bctween several external 
conflict activities. lt does make a differencc whethcr a state reacts 
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against external interf erence or aggression or engages in a hostile foreign 
policy without having previously been the target of such a policy. Only 
in the latter case will the externalization hypothesis apply. Despite their 
importance, these problems cannot be analyzed with the external con-
flict data presently available. 
Even though intemal protest and conflict correlate significantly with 
external conflict activities, these findings do not support the externaliza-
tion hypothesis. Only a very weak correlation between internal protest 
or conflict and external conflict survives the control of population size 
irrespective of the techniq ue used. The results f or 1966-196 7 point to a 
spurious relationship instead of supporting the causality implied by the 
externalization hypothesis. We thus agree with Rummel and Tanter as 
to the causal aspect of the hypothesis. even though our correlations are 
much higher than theirs. What we find puzzling is not that Rummel and 
Tanter reject the externalization hypothesis but rather that they are 
not able to find any relationship at all between internal and external 
conflicts. A positive zero-order correlation should be expected due to 
the simple fact that the greater and the more populated a country, the 
more frequent its internal and external conflict activities should be. 
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